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INTERPRETIVE THEORY IN ITS INFANCY: 
A REPLY TO POSNER 
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In law, problems of interpretation can be explored at different 
levels of generality. At the most specific level, people might urge that 
the Equal Protection Clause forbids affirmative action, or that the 
Food and Drug Act applies to tobacco products. At a higher level of 
generality, people might argue that the Equal Protection Clause 
should be interpreted in accordance with the original understanding of 
its ratifiers, or that the meaning of the Food and Drug Act should be 
settled with careful attention to its legislative history. At a still higher 
level of generality, people might identify the considerations that bear 
on the selection of one or another approach to interpretation, with or 
without reaching a conclusion about the appropriate approach. 
In Interpretation and Institutions, we proceed at the highest level of 
generality, without offering final judgments about our preferred ap­
proach or about particular cases.1 Our principal submission is that any 
judgment about the preferred approach must pay a great deal of atten­
tion to institutional capacities and dynamic effects. We intend this 
submission as a constructive one - one that helps clarify the grounds 
for reasonable disagreement and that suggests the possibility of em­
pirical research that might actually be helpful. In our view, the study 
of legal interpretation remains in its infancy, and we are confident that 
in part as a result of such research, the legal culture will know a great 
deal more in twenty years than it knows today.2 In emphasizing the 
importance of attending to institutional capacities and dynamic effects, 
we presented a survey, illustrative rather than exhaustive, of a wide 
range of work that seems to us to have neglected those capacities and 
1. We hope that this point will clarify a number of Posner's misunderstandings. For 
example, we do not "deplore" what Posner calls "[t]he 'outrage' test for unconstitutionality ." 
See Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Stattttory and Constit11tional 
Interpretation. 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 963 (2003) [hereinafter Posner, Reply]. And because 
our focus is not on particular results, Posner's claims of inconsistency between Sunstein's 
prior work and what is said here are at best overstated. 
2. Exhibit No. J: A first-year law student recently asked one of the current authors: 
"Can you refer me to studies of different interpretive practices in different states, and of 
whether state legislatures are acting differently in responses to those different practices?" 
The student was amazed to hear that there are no such studies, putting aside a small number 
of case studies and anecdotal reports. 
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those effects. We also attempted to identify some empirical questions 
that might cast light on the underlying issues. 
We are grateful to Judge Posner for his spirited and lengthy reply. 
But his disagreements with us are minor - more rhetorical than real. 
In a department (not a law school) of a well-known university, senior 
faculty members are said to respond to new ideas in one of two ways. 
(a) "We did that." (b) "We never did that." Posner's reply has some of 
this flavor. 
Posner has misunderstood our views in at least three respects. 
First, Posner takes us to "praise ... judicial formalism."3 As we stated, 
our twofold project is to argue that the choice between formalism and 
antiformalism must be made on institutional and empirical grounds, 
rather than conceptual or linguistic grounds, and also to describe the 
conditions under which formalism or antiformalism would be the 
better choice for particular institutions or societies.4 One of us 
(Vermeule) indeed believes that current American law should become 
more formalist, but it is not our concern here to make the arguments 
on formalism's behalf.5 The large stretches of Posner's discussion that 
challenge interpretive formalism, then, are irrelevant to our claims. 
Second, Posner accuses us of understating the extent to which past 
work has viewed interpretation through an institutional lens. We 
cannot imagine that Posner has any real disagreement with our central 
claim, which is that most such work is insufficiently resolute about the 
institutional approach. To be sure, a great deal of interpretive scholar­
ship talks about legislatures, agencies and courts; how could it be 
otherwise? Of course our claim is not that we are the first to connect 
institutions to interpretation. In our view, however, most interpretive 
theorizing goes wrong either by adopting a stylized and nonempirical 
account of institutional capacities, or by adopting an asymmetrical 
account that views one type of institution, usually legislatures, through 
a realist lens, while viewing others, usually courts, in utopian terms. 
Posner does not engage these claims, challenging instead a view that 
we do not hold and that we agree to be ludicrous. 
Third, Posner says that we deny the inevitability of casual empiri­
cism in interpretive theory and in law generally, while failing to 
propose feasible empirical work ourselves. Perhaps we were insuffi­
ciently clear, but we agree that casual empiricism is inevitable. Indeed 
3. Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 952. 
4. Posner's claims about how a "literalist" would interpret the Constitution, see id. at 
962-63, raise many complexities. The most obvious of these is that in most of the cases he 
discusses, the relevant provisions are ambiguous. and no literal meaning requires the results 
he describes. For example, the Equal Protection Clause literally requires equal protection, 
but without more specification. that requirement does not require, permit, or forbid affirma­
tive action. 
5. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice. 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000). 
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we would go further: in the absence of empirical knowledge, people 
need to rely on presumptions, rules of thumb, and other techniques 
that help produce decisions in the face of uncertainty.6 But the inevi­
tability of casual empiricism, in areas where little is yet known, doesn't 
mean we can't simultaneously try to find out more; casual and formal 
empiricism are not mutually exclusive, as Posner seems to assume. In 
any case, we have tried to suggest a number of empirical projects, just 
one of them involving an understanding of the performance of state 
courts. 
In the remainder of this Reply, we investigate two of Posner's 
objections in greater detail, simply because an investigation of those 
objections might clarify our basic claims. The first objection involves 
different types of institutional blindness. The second involves the 
feasibility and usefulness of empirical work, especially in light of the 
apparent difficulty of evaluating empirical findings without antecedent 
agreement on what constitutes a correct or incorrect interpretation. 
II. BLINDNESSES 
Our article identified three types of institutional blindness. We 
might describe the three types along the following lines. 
(1) Out-and-out Philosophizing. 
These are theorists who attempt to derive an account of interpreta­
tion from resolutely noninstitutional premises, particularly high-level 
political concepts like "democracy" and "authority," or abstrac­
tions about the character of language. Posner is right to say that 
philosopher-lawyers like Dworkin are the paradigm example here. 
Posner says that these philosopher-lawyers aren't trying to answer all 
the relevant questions at once; they're focusing on first-best questions, 
leaving institutional considerations for other scholars. But to this point 
he also supplies the right rebuttal: doing a partial analysis is valuable, 
but it isn't possible to use that analysis to derive conclusions about 
specific interpretive doctrines and outcomes, absent any account of 
the institutional considerations that always intervene between abstract 
premises and concrete conclusions. 
So far, so good. The trouble is that Posner suggests, incorrectly, 
that this is our charge against all interpretive theory. We agree that 
many previous accounts have considered institutional ideas in some 
fashion or other. But in addition to ignoring institutional considera­
tions entirely, there are other ways in which interpretive theories go 
wrong. Most accounts of interpretation have stumbled into additional 
pitfalls. 
6. See id. 
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(2) Stylized Institutionalism. 
Here the interpretive theorist talks about comparative institutional 
competence, but in a stylized or stereotyped way, on the basis of ab­
stract visions of "legislatures" and "courts." This is our understanding 
of Hart and Sacks: the talk is of institutions, but the institutions are 
pictured in fuzzy, and excessively laudatory, ways that correspond only 
hazily to the realities of American government. (As explained below, 
we fear that Posner may be making the same mistake when he de­
scribes American appellate courts as councils of "wise elders,"7 except 
that Posner is not as charitable to legislatures as were Hart and Sacks.) 
(3) A symmetrical Institutionalism. 
Here the characteristic mistake is to take a cynical or pessimistic 
view of some institutions and a unjustifiably rosy view of others. In 
constitutional law, John Hart Ely's "process" theory,8 in which far­
sighted and politically responsible courts police invidious stereotyping 
and other process failures on the part of dysfunctional legislatures, is 
an exemplar. Ely's theory is attractive to many; but what if courts are 
unwilling to do what Ely urges, and what if courts would fail to do the 
task well if they tried? Much of public choice theory is similar, albeit 
with a different diagnosis of process failure - one that sees inefficient 
rent seeking by legislators and interest groups, rather than racial dis­
crimination, as the principal danger that the process-policing judiciary 
is to prevent.9 (Eskridge, by the way, seems to us to make the same 
mistake, albeit with slightly different emphases.) Posner taxes us for 
not mentioning process theory or public choice, but he seems not to 
realize that asymmetrical accounts of this sort can't be taken very 
seriously anymore, at least not as offering complete support for any 
view of interpretation. Treatments by Komesar, Elhauge, and others 
have demonstrated, in different but compatible ways, the inability of 
asymmetrical institutionalism to underwrite plausible conclusions 
about constitutional and statutory interpretation.10 
We may summarize our overview of interpretive theory by saying 
that we argue for an institutionalism that is evenhandedly empirical -
an institutional account that is realistic about the capacities of all rele­
vant actors. Our challenge to interpretive theories past and present, 
then, is not the absurdly sweeping claim that Judge Posner attributes 
7. See Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 959. 
8. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
9. For overviews and selections from this l iterature, see DANIEL FARBER & PHILIPP. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); MAXWELL 
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW ( 1997). 
to. For a discussion of these scholars and their work, see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Verrneule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 937 (2003) (hereinafter 
Sunstein & Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions]. 
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to us, to the effect that institutional issues are generally or universally 
ignored. 
As for Posner's own work on interpretation: to date, he himself has 
fallen firmly into the third category, that of ·asymmetrical institution­
alism, because he holds a persistently jaundiced picture of legislative 
and administrative capacities and a persistently celebratory view of 
(other) appellate judges. Consider Posner's amusing vision of 
American appellate courts as councils of "wise elders."11 (Does this 
apply to state appellate courts, say the Rhode Island intermediate 
courts, as well as to the Seventh Circuit?) Posner says that this vision 
rests on "institutional factors."12 So it does, in part, but the qualifier is 
crucial: the only factors Posner's partial analysis considers are charac­
teristics of judges that happen to support a benign view of judicial 
capacities. Here is Posner's discussion: 
Judges of the higher American courts are generally picked from the 
upper tail of the population distribution in terms of age, education, intel­
ligence, disinterest, and sobriety. They are not tops in all these depart­
ments but they are well above average, at least in the federal courts be­
cause of the elaborate preappointment screening of candidates for 
federal judgeships. Judges are schooled in a profession that sets a high 
value on listening to both sides of an issue before making up one's mind, 
on sifting truth from falsehood, and on exercising a detached judgment. 
Their decisions are anchored in the facts of concrete disputes between 
real people. Members of the legal profession have played a central role 
in the political history of the United States, and the profession's institu­
tions and usages are reflectors of the fundamental political values that 
have emerged from that history. Appellate judges in nonroutine cases 
are expected to express as best they can the reasons for their decisions in 
signed, public documents (the published decisions of these courts) and 
this practice creates accountability and fosters a certain reflectiveness 
and self-discipline.'3 
Revealingly absent from this account, however, is the requisite 
comparison of these factors to the characteristics of legislators (or for 
that matter agency officials). Legislators are also picked from the 
upper tail of the population distribution on all the measures Posner 
mentions, and if they are not so detached as judges they have much 
better information about real-world consequences than judges do. A 
whiff of guild interest hangs about Posner's· discussion when he says 
that "[m]embers of the legal profession have played a central role in 
the political history of the United States, and the profession's institu-
11. Posner. Reply, supra note 1. at 959. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 959 n.33 (quoting Richard A. Posner. Pragmatic Adjudication. in THE 
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235. 
243-44 (Morris Dickstein ed .. 1998) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication]) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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tions and usages are reflectors of the fundamental political values that 
have emerged from that history."14 We would be surprised if Posner 
really believes that lawy�rs, as a class, have unique insight into the 
nation's fundamental political and moral values. And in any event 
legislators are often lawyers as well. Posner urges that we simply 
"disagree" with his assessment of institutional capacities. Not so. The 
point of disagreement is that we think his assessment fails, not because 
it is substantively erroneous {we are agnostic about that), but instead 
because it neglects to provide a full comparative assessment of the 
relevant institutional factors. 
III. ANTECEDENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE 
Posner briefly suggests that our proposal for empirical investiga­
tions, attempting to identify mistakes and injustices, "is a nonstarter 
unless there is some objective method of determining whieh decisions 
are mistaken or unjust."15 We are more optimistic. In some cases, 
people who disagree on the "objective method," or at least the right 
method, might be able to agree that one or another result counts as 
mistaken or unjust. Imagine, for example, a jurisdiction in which liter­
alist interpretations produced outcomes· that no reasonable person 
could endorse, and in which the relevant legislature could not antici­
pate those outcomes in advance or correct them after they occurred. 
In such a jurisdiction, the case for absurdity-·avoiding nonliteral inter­
pretations, at least in compelling · circumstances, would be very 
strong.16 Nor is the example fanciful: Is it irrelevant, in this regard, that 
in the United States (and many other nations as well), there seems to 
be a consensus in favor of interpreting statutes nonliterally in the case 
of obvious drafting errors?17 
Posner doesn't like all of our proposals for empirical work. He 
suggests research projects that he would prefer. But we continue to 
believe that it would be revealing and informative to know whether 
courts are especially literalist in areas in which Congress is engaged in 
more aggressive oversight of judicial decisions. If this is so, literalism 
would be well-matched to congressional attentiveness. We also think it 
eminently feasible, and potentially valuable, to compare the interpre­
tive practices of the various states, to have a better sense of what 
l4. Id. (quoting Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 13, at 235, 243-44) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
15. Id. at 966. 
16. Hence this is the short answer to the final question on Judge Posner's list of 
questions. See id. at 970-71. All of the questions are interesting and important, but the sixth 
is the only that directly bears on our claims. See id. at 971. 
17. For more detailed discussion. see Sunstein & Vermeule, Interpretation and 
lnstiflltions. supra note lO. 
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judges are actually doing. We agree that rigorous empirical studies 
present a daunting challenge; the empirical study of law remains in its 
infancy.18 (We confess that we are not terribly excited about Posner's 
suggestion that academics should study the relationship between state 
legislative activity and judicial salaries. To each his own!) 
But our major goal is not to set out a formal empirical agenda of 
any kind. We urge that large-scale conceptual claims cannot settle 
current disputes about interpretation; that any claims about interpre­
tation are incomplete if they ignore institutional considerations; and 
that an understanding of those considerations helps explain what, 
exactly, reasonable people are currently disagreeing about. We do not 
take Posner to have challenged any of these claims. Indeed, he has 
given further reasons to accept all of them. We might be having a 
debate. But we do not believe that we are having a disagreement. 
18. Of course, many law professors are not trained to do empirical work, but this is 
changing. We have referred to William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Stattttory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
